We present evidence from a randomized …eld experiment explictly designed to shed light on the role of standard information, goal framed information, and decision task complexity in individuals' choice of payment method. The experiment encouraged 19,707 Clients of the Belgian National O¢ ce for Family Bene…ts to change from bene…t payment by check to payment via direct transfer via a one-time mailing. The direct mailings multiplied the switching rate of these treated individuals (relative to the controls) by more than four times, showing that simply providing information can result in a very large behavioural change. Interestingly, foreigners were much more reponsive to the direct mailings than Belgians. Furthermore, simple, lowcost supplements to the standard information can amplify the magnitude of the behavioural responses. Adding both a ‡yer and a speci…c plan supplement to the standard letter not only yielded the largest e¤ects on individuals' method of payment choice, but also appeared to speed up the decision to switch. We provide a simple, behavioural economics'interpretation to account for our results.
Introduction
Today, social security institutions feel increasingly pressed to make use of electronic payment methods when dispersing welfare bene…ts. Rapid banking sector modernization and recent, sharp increases in the cost of checks have notably contributed to this trend: in Belgium for instance, the price for issuing a check has more than tripled over the past …ve years. But also, the belief that people's decision to receive welfare bene…ts by check may in fact not be in their own best interests, and further that by encouraging welfare recipients to switch to automatic transfers, governments might too tip these people from the fringes into the …nancial mainstream, has in e¤ect led several welfare programs today to prioritize the need to minimize transfer checks. Despite this, however, little is known about the reasons why such large shares of welfare bene…ciaries at present fail to use electronic payment methods, how governments can really in ‡uence the choice of payment mode by these welfare bene…caries, and how this switch to electronic government transfers might impact consumer behaviour and poverty more generally. Whether government can e¤ectively induce welfare recipients to switch payment method and at what 'true' cost remains an open, and important, empirical question. We present evidence from a large-scale experiment explicitly designed to shed light on these issues, and in particular the …rst and the second one.
In April 20007, the Child Bene…t O¢ ce of the Belgian government (the socalled the 'National O¢ ce for Family Bene…ts for Salaried Persons') undertook to encourage its bene…ciaries to switch to automatic government transfers via a major information campaign. The goal of the campaign was to inform people about a speci…c, newly introduced law, which specially protects child support bene…ts from outstanding debt claims even when deposited onto a bank account, and, exploiting this instance, to draw people's attention to the welfare gains more broadly from switching to electronic government transfers. This presented us with an ideal setting to examine empirically the role of information in welfare recipients'choice of payment mode. So we ask to what extent people currently stick to welfare checks simply because they are not fully aware of the gains from switching payment mode, and/or they …nd it di¢ cult to implement that switch because of e.g. myopia, the task's complexity, a tendency to procrastinate or a status quo bias.
We essentially designed the campaign in collaboration with Belgium's 'National O¢ ce for Family Bene…ts for Salaried Persons'(henceforth, the National O¢ ce for Family Bene…ts), adapting the campaign to the format of a randomized …eld experiment. The experiment encouraged 19, 707 bene…ciaries (who at the time of the experiment were all receiving their child bene…t via check) through a one-time mailing sent by the National O¢ ce for Family Bene…ts. These bene…ciaries were randomly assigned to one of …ve di¤erent treatment groups (and one control group). All the treatment groups received a basic, informative letter that spelled out the gains from payment via transfer with a particular emphasis on the newly introduced law. Some groups also received a supplement, which contained independently randomized "psychological"features that were motivated by speci…c frames and cues shown to work in labs and in theory, but from a normative standpoint ought to have no impact. The supplement was a ‡yer that di¤erentially framed the government's message, emphasizing either the gains from switching to payment on a bank account or the losses from failing to switch. Some groups additionally received not only a ‡yer but also a step-by-step 1 plan on how one should proceed to change the bene…t payment method.
Our research design combined with individual level data from administrative records on payment mode allows us to provide evidence on how di¤erent kinds of information a¤ect people's payment method choice. We identify the e¤ects of the presentation and informational details of the campaign on individuals' switching decision and the timing of this decision (early versus late), and use individual level data to examine whether the campaign succeeded in in ‡uencing the switching decision of those individuals whose decision we might expect to be most di¢ cult to sway.
Four main results stand out. First, treated bene…ciaries were more than four times as likely to switch payment method than control bene…ciaries. Furthermore, one out of four treated bene…-ciaries changed payment mode. We also evidence no signi…cant behavioural response to the law prior to the campaign, supporting our central claim that (in our context) information matters.
Second, we also show how various details of the information provided can signi…cantly shape the size of the behavioural response. Supplying decision-makers with easy-to-comprehend information in the form of a ‡yer (over and above to the standard, informative letter) raised bene…ciary compliance with 2 percentage points relative to the standard, informative letter alone. Furthermore, supplementing the standard letter with a ‡yer ánd a speci…c, step-by-step plan raised bene…ciary compliance even more. The impacts of the supplements were large in relative terms (raising the likelihood of switching by 10 to 18 percent after 2 months), though somewhat small in absolute terms (an increase of 2 to 4 percentage points on a base of 24 percent for the standard letter group only). Third, the letter plus ‡yer plus speci…c plan treatment not only produced the largest e¤ect on bene…ciaries'switching decision, it also noticeably raised the speed of compliance. The implementation plan thus appears to have helped mitigate people's tendency to procrastinate. Finally, foreign welfare recipients were not only more likely to switch, they were also signi…cantly more responsive to the direct mailings than Belgians. This suggests not only that complexity and information costs represent important hurdles to the use of electronic payment methods, but also that these costs are apparently greater for those with language barriers and immigration concerns.
Our results show that government can reap considerable e¢ ciency gains (savings) simply by adopting more e¤ective social marketing strategies. This insight stands in stark contrast with a tendency by government agencies to underappreciate the potential impact of marketing as a "super…cial" yet highly e¢ cient intervention. The positive impact on government expenditures, however, is not the sole reason why our experiment especially matters. Various strands of research indicate that switching payment method can yield signi…cant consumer gains as well. A large literature on mental accounting, for instance, has argued that people tend to treat money in di¤erent mental accounts di¤erently (see e.g. Thaler, 1990 , Thaler, 1999 . In particular, there is substantial evidence that shows that an individual's marginal propensity to spend a euro in the current bank account tends to be lower than the marginal propensity to spend a euro in cash. Accordingly, switching payment method could also signi…cantly raise consumer welfare via its positive impacts on household savings, 1 and personal …nance management more broadly. Since many of the wel-fare recipients paid by check are also unbanked, the decision to switch to electronic government transfers might also be instrumental to becoming part of the …nancial mainstream.
Finally, our …ndings show how information can produce large e¤ects on individuals' behaviour, even in an important domain as personal …nances. When observing behavioural di¤erences between people from di¤erent socio-economic backgrounds, these di¤erences are often attributed to distinct individual characteristics. This paper, by contrast, draws attention to the power of information, as well as simple, purportedly minor situational cues. 2 It draws attention to the informational "details," and at the same time, considering the still relatively small increments in compliance achieved by the ‡yers and implementation plans, urges us to experiment more with various such details.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides more detail on the experimental manipulations or treatments. Section 3 describes the child bene…t programme, the design of the experiment and the data. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
Treatments
Each "Client" of the National O¢ ce for Family Bene…ts paid by check (at the time of the information campaign) was sent one of …ve di¤erent mailings. We detail the features below along with the prior work and hypotheses underlying these treatments. Our motivation stems primarily from …ndings in psychology and marketing that are most closely related to theories of consumers'information acquisition process. We discuss alternative interpretations of treatment e¤ects in Section 4.
Our …rst treatment group simply received a standard, informative letter drafted by the National O¢ ce for Family Bene…ts. The letter starts by explaining to the reader that since January 2007 a new Belgian law has come into force, which extends a special protection from outstanding debt claimants to government transfers, including child bene…t, when paid directly onto a bank account 3 .
Prior to this law, such protection was only guaranteed for bene…ts paid by check. The law was thus explicitly designed to remove fear of outstanding debt claimants as a motive for steering away from the use of electronic government transfers. Besides information about this law, the letter also listed the wider individual gains from receiving child bene…ts by direct deposit rather than by program. Substantial empirical research has indeed also shown that imperfect information and program complexity e¤ectively constitute important barriers to welfare bene…t take-up (see e.g. Aizer, 2003; Aizer, 2007) , and that such e¤ects may in fact be more important than stigma (Currie, 2004 ). 4 With the remaining four experimental manipulations, we essentially aimed to investigate whether simple "extra features" can augment the e¢ cacy of the information campaign. The paper thus adds to a new direction for empirical research, which is to move beyond merely estimating the size of behavioural responses to information, and instead analyse how various speci…c nuances of presentation and framing can shape the size of the behavioural response (see e.g. Bertrand et al., 2008; Saez, 2008) .
We designed two ‡yers that conveyed similar information as in the standard letter, but in a more transparent and easily accessible way. Furthermore, guided by a large body of cognitive literature about goal framing e¤ects, we created one ‡yer that highlighted the gains from action (e.g., "Receiving your child bene…t via direct transfers is much safer") and another that discussed the losses from inaction (e.g., "Receiving your child bene…t via check is not safe"). Apart from the framing manipulation, the two ‡yers were identical. Our interest was to assess whether these ‡yers can e¤ectively improve the responsiveness to the information provided, and whether the persuasive message had a di¤erent appeal depending on whether it stressed the positive consequences of switching or the negative consequences of not switching. Please …nd a copy of one of the ‡yers in the Appendix.
A common …nding in the literature is that negative (loss) frames are more e¤ective than positive (gain) frames in the context of goal framing, but this …nding is far from robust. There is evidence of higher e¤ectiveness for negative frames in the context of breast self-examination (Meyerowitz and Chaiken, 1987) , evaluation of prizes or jobs (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991) , and mammography screening (Banks et al., 1995; Rothman and Salovey, 1997) . However, other studies have failed to …nd such e¤ects in contexts such as breast self-examination (Lalor and Hailey, 1990 ), treatment of breast cancer (Simino¤, Fetting and Abelo¤, 1989) , testicular self-examination (Ste¤en et al., 1994) , and follow-up for abnormal pap-smear test results (Lauver and Rubin, 1990) . It has been suggested that the negative frame bias is linked to "loss aversion," that is, people's tendency to avoid a loss more than to achieve a gain of the same magnitude (e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1990; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991) or a "negativity bias in information processing,"that is, people's tendency to be more responsive to negative information than objectively equivalent positive information (e.g. Fiske and Taylor, 1991) . Singer and Jones (1965) found that when they provided subjects with speci…c plans for action versus general recommendations, this had a signi…cant, positive e¤ect on adherence to the recommended act (which was in their case, taking a tetanus shot). Thus, apart from the recent experimentation with the design 401(k) savings'enrollment forms, we are not aware of any other real-world, researchled experiments that have systematically looked at how simplifying a decision to act can indeed raise compliance behaviour.
Setting, Experimental Design and Data
We identify the e¤ects of providing standard information, and of augmenting that standard information with goal framed information (presented in a ‡yer format) and implementation plans using randomly assigned variation in the direct mailings. The National O¢ ce for Family Bene…ts sent a mailing to 19,707 Clients, the full population of its bene…ciaries paid by check (at the time of the information campaign), encouraging them to switch to electronic payment methods. The en-couragement was presented with variations on …ve randomly assigned information content features (as detailed in the previous section). Below, we describe the Belgian child support system and our cooperating Child Bene…t Fund. We provide additional details about the experimental design.
Finally, we introduce the data that we worked with.
Child Bene…t Support and the National O¢ ce for Family Bene…ts
Our collaborator, the National O¢ ce for Family Bene…ts for Salaried Persons, is the sole governmental body in Belgium that administers child bene…t support. With roughly 20 percent of 'market share', it is the largest of such agencies; the remaining 80 percent of child bene…t support is served by 23 di¤erent private child bene…t funds. 5 Child bene…t transfers in Belgium are essentially monthly, lump-sum government payments, which vary with the number, rank and age of children in the household and are augmented with means-tested supplementary allowances. 6 Typically, child bene…t support constitutes a very signi…cant source of household income; to illustrate, for a household with a median income and two children between the ages of 12 and 17, child bene…t transfers represent over 25 percent of that household's net income. Hence, any systematic relationship between payment mode and household spending and saving decisions (see e.g. Berg, 2007 ) is likely to be consequential to household welfare. This makes it very important to understand how payment method decisions are made, and how they can be in ‡uenced.
At the time of the information campaign, nearly 10 percent of the National O¢ ce for Family Bene…ts' Clients were paid by check. It is noteworthy that child bene…t checks were (and still are) in practice 7 the 'default option,' that is to say, if the bene…ciary does nothing, the default is that the bene…ciary will receive the child bene…t payment by check. Moreover, the standard procedure to set up payment via direct transfer is complex, requiring e.g. signatures from both the bene…ciary and his/her bank. 8 There is substantial evidence on the sizeable e¤ects that defaults can have on economic decisions and outcomes, particulary when the decision-making task at hand is complex (see e.g. Beshears et al., 2006 ).
Finally, a brief note on terminology. The National O¢ ce for Family Bene…ts essentially distin- 5 Clients of the National O¢ ce for Family Bene…ts appear to be representative of the Belgian population as a whole. Along none of the basic socio-demographic dimensions, we …nd any systematic deviations from the population of Belgian households with children. 6 At the time of our study, the basic monthly bene…ts for the …rst, the second and the third child were 81.77, 151.30 and 225.90 euros, respectively. These basic amounts are augmented by an age supplement, which at the time of our study, equalled 28.41 euros (for a child between 6-11 years old), 43.41 euros (for a child between 12-17 years old) or 55.19 euros (for a child between 18-24 years old). The social supplement varied between 20.81 and 41.63 euros.
guishes three types of 'entitled individuals' 9 based on the latter's status in the labour market. The …rst group comprises employees, i.e., those individuals who activated their entitlement through their status as employee or former employee (say in case of unemployment, pension, decease or disability), with the exception of those employed or formerly employed in the public sector. There is a second, separate group comprised of civil servants only, i.e., individuals who activated their entitlement through their employment or former employment at a government institution. Finally, the third group consists of individuals who currently do not or have never actively participated in the labour market and thus are unable to claim a right to child bene…t support on the basis of their active labour market position. The overwhelming majority of entitled individuals that belong to this third group (90 percent to be precise) receive basic income support, which indicates that this group comprises a disproportionate share of needy households. These individuals are entitled to so-called guaranteed child bene…ts 10 . The guaranteed child bene…ts are fully administered by the National O¢ ce for Family Bene…ts and not by private child bene…t funds. Finally, it is noteworthy that the 'entitled individual'is not necessarily the bene…ciary who actually receives the child bene…t: for over half of all individual child bene…ts granted, the entitled individual is the father, whereas the bene…ciary is typically the mother. 11 
Experimental Design
Using the administrative data from the National O¢ ce for Family Bene…ts, we selected the entire population of Clients who at the time of the mailing (in April 2007) received their child bene…t support via check (N = 19; 707). This group was then strati…ed (or blocked) using the following set of bene…ciary-speci…c control variables: age, sex, total number of children for which the individual receives child bene…t support, recipient of a social supplement 12 (binary variable), language (Dutch or French), status type of the entitled individual linked to the bene…ciary, region of residence (Flanders, Wallonia, Brussels Capital), province of residence, and degree of urbanisation of area of residence. 13 Afterwards, we randomly assigned Clients in each stratum to one of the following six groups: At the time of our 'sample'selection, the National O¢ ce of Family Bene…ts served only 190 German speaking bene…ciaries, 60 of them being paid by check (that is, 0.3 percent of 19,707). This group was in block assigned to treatment group receiving only the standard information letter, because the National O¢ ce of Family Bene…ts judged that the costs of translating the ‡yers and speci…c plan would have been proportionately too high and because the number of German speaking bene…ciaries per stratum would have become negligeably small. Because they were not assigned randomly to the treatment groups, the 60 German speaking bene…ciaries were not included in the …nal analyses.
Further, we conducted our analysis on a sample that slightly deviated from the original sample for several additional, notably tractable and justi…able, reasons. First, we dropped those Clients that had left the National O¢ ce for Family Bene…ts by June (1,279 cases). Luckily, this attrition was non-voluntarily, rather for reasons such as a change of employer or because the age of the child exceeded the maximum age for entitlement to family bene…ts. Furthermore, we found that Clients who had dropped out of our sample were equally spread across the treatment groups, suggesting that our initial randomisation was indeed successful. Second, we excluded from our analyses those individuals who had not yet received two child bene…t payments at the time of the experiment (145 cases). We isolated this group using detailed data on each bene…ciary's payment history since February 2006. The idea here was to exclude bene…ciaries who were perhaps still paid via check simply because they had not yet had the chance to inform the National O¢ ce of their bank account details. Furthermore, we also excluded the 119 bene…ciaries who were bene…ciary for children from more than one entitled individual. Many of these bene…ciaries had mistakenly received two di¤erent mailings, because in the original dataset they were included twice or more (once for every entitled individual they were associated with). Finally, 98 cases were left out of the analysis because they had a missing variable on one of our predictor variables, namely marital status. Importantly, on none of our bene…ciary-speci…c variables/dimensions did the resulting sample of 18,006 individuals statistically di¤er from the original sample of 19,707 individuals. Furthermore, the attrition was equally spread over the di¤erent treatment groups. The …nal size of the treatment groups was on average 3,001, with a minimum of 2,951 and a maximum of 3,039.
Using a large-scale randomized …eld experiment to estimate the impacts of information on payment method choice straightforwardly presents several unique advantages relative to say using laboratory 8 evidence or evidence from a natural …eld experiment. 14 At the same time, ethical and practical concerns raised by the National O¢ ce for Family Bene…ts also put some constraints on our experimental design. First, because the National O¢ ce for Family Bene…ts is a governmental body it is obliged to guarantee equality of treatment and information to all its bene…ciaries. Therefore, it was ethically unfeasible to delay the mailing to individuals in the control group by more than two months. However, we judged that this constraint was unlikely to limit the scope or reliability of our research: we expected that the biggest impact of our treatments would occur during the …rst two months after the mailing. Moreover, after two months, it would become increasingly di¢ cult to separate out the mailing e¤ect from potential other confounding e¤ects such as social network e¤ects (e.g., via conversations of the bene…ciaries with family or friends who had also received a (maybe di¤erent) mailing). Second, the standard information letter had to be sent to all of the bene…ciaries. We were thus able to study the incremental e¤ect of the ‡yer and the speci…c plan, but not the net e¤ects. A signi…cant incremental e¤ect can be the result of two mechanisms (or a combination of both), namely the e¤ect of the supplement itself, and the e¤ect of a repetition of the message.
Data
We gathered detailed information on each Client making use of three di¤erent data sources: the administrative database of the National O¢ ce for Family Bene…ts for Salaried Persons, the National Registry, and the Crossroads Bank for Social Security. 15 To merge the data from these sources, we used the bene…ciaries'unique national identi…cation number, made available to us (anonymously) by the Crossroads Bank.
In order to assess the e¤ects of the experiment on choice of payment method, the National O¢ ce (here, of where the bene…ciary lives) to one of eight distinct urbanization types. 16 We gathered details on the bene…ciary's marital status using the National Registry. However, since marital status only refers to the status of the bene…ciary as registered o¢ cially, we complemented this measure with another categorical variable indicating whether the entitled individual and bene…ciary are part of the same household (cohabitation). To do so, we took advantage of the fact that the National Registry includes a unique household identi…er. This newly constructed variable comprises four categories: bene…ciary and entitled live in the same household, bene…ciary and entitled live in di¤erent household, bene…ciary and entitled are the same individual, and a rest group with unknowns. We also used the National Registry to collect information about the nationality of each bene…ciary. Finally, we established whether the bene…ciary was (at the time of our sample selection) employed as a salaried person (employed ) using data from the Crossroads Bank.
The summary statistics for the sample of 18,006 Clients paid by check (at the time of the experiment) are displayed in Table 1 , broken down into six groups. Panels A, B and C present, respectively, bene…ciary-speci…c background characteristics, child bene…t-related characteristics, and residence-related characteristics. Evidently, the overwhelming majority of bene…ciaries were female. Nearly two-thirds of bene…ciaries were aged between 25 and 44, and approximately half of the bene…ciaries were married. Most of the bene…ciaries (83,6 %) had the Belgian nationality.
Also, the largest share of entitled individuals had been unemployed for over six months, and around 60 percent of bene…ciaries received child bene…t support for one child only. Finally, over half of bene…ciaries lived in Wallonia. Because the groups were strati…ed and were chosen randomly, the mean of observable bene…ciary-speci…c characteristics such as sex, age and marital status, and regional-speci…c characteristics such as region and degree of urbanization, are very similar across groups, and none of the di¤erences are signi…cant.
Results

A. The Large Behavioural Responses To The Information Campaign
In Panel D of Table 1 , we can see that overall the mailings produced a large, behavioural response; indeed, in the treated groups, as many as 25 percent of Clients switched, whereas in the control group, fewer than 4 percent switched. In other words, treated bene…ciaries were more than four times as likely to switch payment method than control bene…ciaries. Notably one out of four treated bene…ciaries e¤ectuated a change in payment mode during the two months following the information campaign. The parameter estimate associated with the dummy is negative and highly signi…cant. Finally, including two dummies, one for June 2007 (two months after the …rst mailing) and one for August 2007 (two months after the mailing to the control group) produces an even better …t (R 2 = 0:996).
The parameter estimates for both dummies are negative and highly signi…cant -with notably the former coe¢ cient estimate being larger than the latter, which is exactly what we would expect because the second mailing was sent to a much smaller group of bene…ciaries. Of course, the analyses presented in Table 2 and Figure 2 do not straightforwardly establish a causal relationship between providing information and payment method choice, since other factors or events might be at play. Nevertheless, we can readily exclude the following set of competing explanations for the discontinuities found around June 2007 and August 2007. That is, we do not observe a statistically signi…cant change in the demographic pro…le of Clients of the National O¢ ce for Family Bene…ts' over the 23-month period under scrutiny. 17 Also, we do not observe any new regulation, change in child bene…t eligibility criteria or change in the price of cashing checks coinciding with the timing of the information campaign and which might have produced a similar e¤ect on parents' payment method choice. To summarize, the evidence presented so far indicates that the new Law alone did not e¤ectuate any signi…cant change in electronic payment usage, whereas the information campaign by contrast produced a large and signi…cant e¤ect.
Finally, the evidence on the responsiveness to the standard letter by those who were initially in the control group allows us to perform a consistency check. Importantly, we cannot reject the hypothesis that by October 2007 the compliance rates for those treated (standard letter only) in April and those treated (standard letter only) in June were statistically the same.
B. Simple Supplements Can Amplify The Effects of Information
A simple comparison of mean switching rate between the standard letter and standard letter plus ‡yer groups (column (1) versus columns (2) and (3) in Panel D of Table 1 ) readily shows that adding the ‡yers raised the switching rate by just over two percentage points relative to the standard information alone. Further, the di¤erence in mean switching rate between the standard letter plus ‡yer groups and standard letter plus ‡yer plus speci…c plan groups (columns (2) and (3) versus (4) and (5) in Panel D of Table 1 ) amounts to roughly another two percentage points. Both ‡yer and ‡yer plus implementation plan thus appear to have noticeably improved the e¤ectiveness of the standard letter alone.
To further analyse the size of the (compliance) e¤ects across treatment groups, we considered a simple reduced-form regression speci…cation. Let y ij denote whether bene…ciary i in group j changed payment method from payment by check to payment via direct transfer. D ij is the dummy for receiving treatment j with j = 2; :::; 6; corresponding with each of the …ve treatments.
The average e¤ects on switching of being in one of the …ve alternatively treated groups rather than in the control group is then captured by the following speci…cation:
where X ij is a set of bene…ciary-speci…c control variables. X ij includes all strati…cation variables, and additional background variables such as marital status or whether the bene…ciary receives a social supplement. The estimates of 2 ; 3 ; 4 ; 5 and 6 are the parameters of primary interest; they correspond, respectively, to the di¤erence in switching rate between the …ve treatment groups on the one hand, and the control group, on the other. " ij is the standard, robust bene…ciary-level error term. Table 3 summarizes the regression results. We readily see that each of the …ve treatments significantly raised compliance relative to the control group, controlling for the strati…cation variables and other bene…ciary-speci…c characteristics. More speci…cally, being in the positively framed or negatively framed ‡yer treatment groups raised the average switching rate by over 2 percentage points relative to the standard letter group. Furthermore, being in the positively framed or negatively framed ‡yer plus speci…c plan treatment groups increased the average switching rate by respectively over 4 percentage points, again relative to the standard letter group. These estimates correspond to the di¤erence in average switching rate reported in Panel D of Table 1 . Obtaining signi…cant di¤erences between the four supplement treatment groups, respectively, and the standard letter group signify that the (goal framed) ‡yers and (goal framed) ‡yers plus speci…c plan did have an impact on switching. This impact is large in relative terms (raising the likelihood of switching by 10 to 18 percent after 2 months), though perhaps small in absolute terms (an increase of 2 to 4 percentage points on a base of 24 percent).
Our experiment does not allow us to unambiguously distinguish between the following interpretations for the estimated 3 ; 4 ; 5 and 6 : The signi…cant incremental e¤ects of adding the ‡yer to the standard letter on people's payment method choice might have been the result of the speci…c information presentation format, where information was graphically portrayed, in a familiar, easyto-comprehend format (see e.g. Winett and Kagel, 1984) or the consequence of the repetition of the self-relevant information (see e.g. Claypool et al., 2004; Capioppo and Petty, 1989) . Likewise the further rise in individuals'responsiveness when sent both the supplementary ‡yer and supplementary implementation plan is consistent both with the impacts of repetition, but also with the impacts of having a simple plan or …rm implementation intentions (see e.g. Ajzen, 1985 and 1991) .
Further, the results summarized in Table 3 also indicate that the likelihood of switching payment method was signi…cantly lower amongst younger parents relative to the group of 35 through 44 of age. One explanation for this is that younger households tend to be in a …nancially more precarious situation, lowering the perceived returns from bank account ownership. Also, parents who had been paid by check for a longer time were signi…cantly less likely to switch, thus exhibiting greater vulnerability to the status quo bias (see e.g., Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988) . Parents with a social supplement or a guaranteed child bene…t displayed a signi…cantly higher likelihood of switching payment method. One interpretation of the latter …nding is that these people typically receive greater support from community welfare workers, who might not only provide assistance with the switching decision but also actively promote this decision. The results also show that none of the residence-related characteristics were signi…cant predictors of the bene…ciary's likelihood of switching payment method.
Interestingly, foreigners were not only more likely to switch to electronic payment methods, they were also signi…cantly more responsive to the information campaign compared to Belgians. Relatedly, though in the context of US medicare, Aizer (2003) found that the positive e¤ect of an outreach campaign on Medicaid enrollments was signi…cantly higher for Hispanics and Asians. We provide two interpretations to account for our result. First, since foreigners typically face higher complexity and informational costs due to language and immigration concerns, they are likely to bene…t more from any information campaign. Alternatively, given that child bene…t support typically constitutes a larger share of foreigners' income, any welfare gains from switching payment method (e.g. savings) are likely to be more consequential for this group and therefore new information about these gains is more likely to trigger a behavioural response.
Finally, our results do not show any valence or goal framing e¤ects, neither when we compare compliance across the two ‡yer only groups, nor when we compare compliance across the ‡yer plus speci…c plan groups. Speci…cally, the mean switching rate in group 2 and group 3 is not signi…cantly di¤erent. Likewise, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the mean switching rates in group 4 and group 5 are equal. One plausible explanation for why we …nd no goal framing e¤ects is that the topic of our message had high intrinsic self-relevance to the bene…ciaries. High intrinsic self-relevance is instantiated when a decision maker spontaneously relates to the decision context.
This was by construction the case since all bene…ciaries we knew were receiving their child bene…t via check. Extending the framework by Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth (1998) to explain previously observed discrepancies in the e¤ects of positive versus negative framing, Krishnamurthy, Carter and Blair (2001) indeed suggest that valence e¤ects may not occur in the context of goal framing when the research topic has high intrinsic self-relevance to the research population.
C. Implementation Plans Favour Early Versus Late Response
To conclude, we examine to what extent the supplement treatments impacted the speed by which parents decided to switch payment method. Extensive literature has indicated that the inability to formulate a plan can block behaviours altogether (see e.g. Lewin, 1951) . Leventhal, Singer, and Jones (1965) found that providing a map of the campus and urging students to make a plan on how and when to go to the in…rmary can signi…cantly improved the e¤ectiveness of a message to get a tetanus shot. Owens, Bowman and Dill (2008) relatedly argue that implementation plans can help overcome procrastination. To test this prediction empirically, we run the following basic Probit regression for each bene…ciary who was sent a mailing in April 2007 and switched payment method during the subsequent six months:
where e ij is a dummy variable for whether the bene…ciary switched early, and as before X ij is a set of bene…ciary-speci…c control variables. X ij includes all strati…cation variables, and additional background variables such as marital status or whether the bene…ciary receives a social supplement. The estimates of 4 and 5 are the parameters of special interest; they correspond, respectively, to the di¤erence in switching early (versus late) between the two ‡yer plus implementation plan treatment groups, respectively, and the standard letter group. " ij is the standard, robust bene…ciary-level error term. Table 3 summarizes the results. We …nd that the ‡yer plus speci…c plan treatments signi…cantly raised the propensity to switch to automatic transfers early (rather late) relative to the standard letter only. Adding a ‡yer alone achieved no such e¤ects. These …ndings suggest that providing implementation plans can e¤ectively counteract people's tendency to procrastinate.
Conclusion
Our …ndings suggest that information matters for important economic decisions. We …nd that a one-time mailing providing information about method of payment for child bene…t support caused a fourfold increase in parents' decision to switch to electronic bene…t transfers. The magnitude of the behavioural response to the mailings were the highest amongst foreigners. Supplements to the standard letter e¤ectively raised people's responsiveness to mailing: adding a simple ‡yer alone or ‡yer and implementation plan augmented the compliance with the mailing's message by, respectively, 2 and 4 percentage points. Overall, our results support the view that complexity and information (processing) costs pose signi…cant barriers to transitioning to electronic payment methods, and that deliberate e¤orts to lower these costs can contribute to large behavioural changes.
The increase in administrative saving generated by the mailing was much greater than its costs.
The mailing induced 4,114 bene…ciaries to change payment method during the …rst two months after the experiment. The administrative saving due to the early switches in response generated by the mailing was thus about 5,143 euros per month or over 61,710 on a yearly basis. The overall costs of the experiment amounted to 9,494 euros. Therefore, the net saving obtained is no doubt large relative to the encouragement costs. 18 Our experiment thus neatly illustrates that the use of marketing techniques need not be in con ‡ict with (severely) limited government budgets.
Understanding the impediments to electronic payment method usage is important for at least two more reasons besides the administrative cost saving argument. First, banking at the …nancial fringes (e.g. using check cashing agencies) typically implies incurring much higher fees. Switching to electronic government transfers could be a …rst step towards becoming part of the typically less exploitative mainstream. Second, the direct deposit of payments can be instrumental to increasing savings and spending in more socially desirable ways. We have shown that a lack of information and task complexity can form decisive obstacles to electronic payment method usage. We thus point to the role of 'channel factors'as important determinants of consumers'method of payment choice that have arguably been overlooked in that literature. At the same time, in light of the still substantial rate of non-responses to the campaign, to argue that payment by check should therefore become mandatory is simply premature; rather, our results lend support to measures like changing the default from payment by check to electronic payment.
In our experiments, we varied the content of the mailing exogenously in order to begin to understand the relationship between informational content, format and frames and people's choice of method of payment. The incremental e¤ects on individuals' method of payment choice generated by the ‡yer and ‡yer plus speci…c plan were notably small, but non-trivial. Overall, the fact that the one-time mailings achieved such large behavioural e¤ects suggests that the processes of information acquisition may be more complex and more consequential than economists have traditionally imagined.
6 List of references Note: We stratified the sample according to: language and age category of the beneficiary, total number of children for which beneficiary receives child benefit support, whether the beneficiary receives a social supplement, status type of the 'entitled individual' linked to the beneficiary, and region, province, degree of urbanization of beneficiary's residence. We have a total of 3,284 or 3,285 possible observations per group. Deviations from this are accounted for by attrition between April and June, by our sample restriction decision to exclude beneficiaries who had not yet received more than one payment and by the exclusion of German beneficiaries, beneficiaries who had mistakenly received two mailings and by missing data. 
FIGURE 1 EVOLUTION OF THE PERCENTAGE BENEFICIARIES PAID BY CHEQUE
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FIGURE 2 OBSERVED AND PREDICTED PERCENTAGE BENEFICIARIES PAID BY CHEQUE FOR DIFFERENT REGRESSION MODELS
Note:
The regression controls for all the stratification variables. None of the residence-related variables significantly predicted beneficiaries' switching decision. B: Reference categories: treatment: control group; sex of beneficiary: female; age of beneficiary: 35-44; foreign: Belgian; marital status beneficiary: unmarried; system of child benefit: category employed. * Significant at the 10-percent level; ** Significant at the 5-percent level; *** Significant at the 1-percent level. 
